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The Mistake on the Snake: The Lower Snake River Dams
Michael C. Blumm*
Congressman Mike Simpson’s proposal to remove the four federal dams on the Lower
Snake River (LSR) has reenergized the longstanding debate over the future of those dams, their
narrow benefits, and their substantial costs, particularly to Endangered Species Act-listed Snake
River salmon. This article examines the LSR dams, their history and justification, their role in
sending Snake River on a path toward extinction from which they have yet to recover, and their
impending liabilities under the Endangered Species and Clean Water Acts. The Simpson proposal,
while arresting, is so freighted with spending on replacement power and river navigation
improvements, for example, that its estimated $33.5 billion price tag seems wholly unrealistic.
And its dam license extensions throughout the Columbia Basin and the litigation moratorium it
would impose until the mid-21st century have generated such substantial opposition that enactment
by Congress, in anything resembling its current form, will have to overcome the longest of odds.
Still, given the imperiled nature of Snake River salmon and the considerable economic benefits
that restored salmon runs could play in revitalizing the central Idaho economy, the proposal may
serve as a beginning for Idaho’s elected officials and its public to focus on the advantages that
restored Idaho salmon runs could play in revitalizing the central Idaho economy. Anything
resembling the Simpson proposal should be welcomed as a considerable economic stimulus for
the region.

Idaho Conservation League
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Columbia Riverkeeper
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I. The Construction of the Lower Snake Dams
II. The Onset of the Salmon Crisis
III. The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
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Conclusion
The Snake River rises in the Teton Mountains of western Wyoming, flows through the
Snake River Plain in southern Idaho, then forms the Oregon-Idaho border in Hells Canyon and,
after traversing the Palouse Hills of eastern Washington, empties into the Columbia River at Tri-
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Cities, Washington, where it supplies over 30 percent of the Columbia’s flow.1 The Snake was
created by Ice-Age flooding events like the Missoula and Bonneville Floods,2 is 1078 miles long3
and drains some 109,000 square miles in six states: Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington.4
Native Americans have lived along the Snake below Shoshone Falls (near present-day
Twin Falls) for over 11,000 years, harvesting the salmon that were plentiful and a vital source of
subsistence, commerce, and culture below Shoshone Falls (the natural limit of salmon migration).5
The dominant native groups at the time of Lewis and Clark were the Nez Perce and the Shoshone,
whose sign language gave the Snake its name.6 By the mid-19th century, the Oregon Trail brought
numerous white settlers to the Snake Basin, and by the end of the century, they began to dam the
river for electricity, navigation, and irrigation.7 Most of these dams were small ones on the Snake
above Hells Canyon.8

*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. Collin Milton, 2L, Lewis
and Clark Law, provided superb help with the footnotes, and Joseph Bogaard made helpful comments on a
draft of this article.
1
See Todd Shallat, Snake River, OREGON ENCYCLOPEDIA: A PROJECT OF THE OREGON HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/snake_river/#.YJ6ysetlDs0 (last visited May 14,
2021).
2
See id.
3
See Snake River Waterkeeper, The River, https://snakeriverwaterkeeper.org/the-river (last visited May,
14 2021).
4
See TIM PALMER, THE SNAKE RIVER: WINDOW TO THE WEST 3 (Island Press 1991).
5
See NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 113 (J.E. Luebering ed., Britannica Educational Publishing 2011);
RIVERS OF NORTH AMERICA 607 (Arthur C. Benke & Colbert E. Cushing, eds., Elsevier Academic Press
2005).
6
White explorers misinterpreted Shoshone sign language for weaving baskets as representing a snake.
Snake River, 38 IDAHO STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY REFERENCE SERIES (1964).
7
White settlers who travelled the Oregon Trail began to dam the Snake River in the 1870s and 1880s.
Shallat, supra note 1. Even before the large dams on the Columbia and the Snake Rivers, steamboat captains
navigated the rivers. See BILL GULICK, STEAMBOATS ON NORTHWEST RIVERs xiii (Caxton Press 2004).
Beginning in the 1850, many of the steamboats brought miners into Hells Canyon. Id. at 40. Steamboats
could navigate downstream as far as Lewiston, Idaho, id. at 85, now the site of a deep-water port from
which barges carry agricultural products to ports downstream.
8
Shallat, supra note 1.
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The transformative event for the lower Snake came later in the 20th century when the Corps
of Engineers began studying the lower Snake for federal development in the 1920s.9 The Corps
reports led Congress to rather causally authorize the Lower Snake River (LSR) dams during World
War II.10 The four LSR dams—all of which are located in the state of Washington—would be
under construction until the early 1980s, although the last of them, Lower Granite, near Lewiston,
became operational in 1975.11 By the end of the 1980s, the dams would be embroiled in
controversy due to the damage they inflicted on salmon migration to and from the central Idaho
spawning grounds. In the 1990s, those salmon runs would be listed for protection under the
provisions of the Endangered Species Act (the ESA).12
The ESA listings may have saved Idaho-bound salmon from extinction, but they have done
little or nothing to recover the species, mostly because the federal agencies charged with
interpreting the ESA imposed only relatively small operational changes to the dams.13
Consequently, considering the desperate condition of the salmon—with most species’ returns in
the Columbia Basin still predicted to remain lower than the ten-year average14—calls for more

9

See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 308, at 3 (1926) (one of the first reports produced by the Corps, authorized by
the River and Harbor Act of 1925).
10
See infra notes 30, 31, 35 and accompanying text.
11
Ice Harbor, the first of the LSR dams, went on line in 1962, with 3 units added in 1976; Lower
Monumental was completed in 1969, with 3 units added in 1981; Little Goose became operational in 1970,
with 3 additional units in 1978; Lower Granite, the last of the LRS dams, was constructed in 1976, with 3
additional units added in 1978. See The Four Lower Snake River Dams, REDFISH BLUEFISH,
http://www.bluefish.org/fourdams.htm (last visited May 13, 2021).
12
The first listing of Snake River salmon was the Snake River sockeye, listed in 1991. Endangered and
Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (proposed
Nov. 20, 1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222). The salmon runs in the Snake River that are listed as
threatened are the spring/summer run of chinook salmon and steelhead. 50 C.F.R. § 223.102 (2019).
Sockeye salmon, listed in 1991, is listed as endangered. 50 C.F.R. § 224.101 (2019).
13
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorsen & Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception:
The Failure of Columbia Basin Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006).
14
See John Harrison, With Few Exceptions, Columbia River Salmon and Steelhead Returns Continue
Downward Trend (Nw. Power and Conservation Council, Mar. 12, 2021) (explaining the overall decline in
the number of returning salmonids and noting the continual downward trend of all species’ returns),
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substantial measures, including removing or breaching the dams,15 have become prominent.16 But
the federal managers of the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system took no substantial action until
ordered to do so by a federal judge, who found the federal ESA response to be inadequate and later
ordered the institution of increased spills of water at the dams to facilitate downstream salmon
migration.17 Recently, environmental and fishing groups have focused on implementing Clean

https://www.nwcouncil.org/news/few-exceptions-columbia-river-salmon-and-steelhead-returns-continuedownward-trend.
15
Breaching a dam means that part of the dam would still exist but would be nonfunctional as a lock for
navigation and incapable of producing hydroelectric power. In the 2020 environmental impact statement
(EIS) that Judge Simon ordered federal operating agencies to prepare, infra note 17, the estimated cost of
breaching the four dams was roughly $800 million. NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, et al.,
COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEMS OPERATIONS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Q-A-8 to 10,
tbl.A-1 (2020). This estimate accounts only for the cost of breaching in terms of (deconstruction costs), not
other costs such as building replacement power to offset the lost electric production or the infrastructure to
replace the barge transpiration lost because of the breaching. The Simpson proposal estimated the cost of
breaching the dams at $1.4 billion, about 4% of the multi-billion-dollar plan). Office of United States
Representative for Idaho, Mike Simpson, The Northwest in Transition, Salmon, Dams and Energy, What
If? 12 https://simpson.house.gov/uploadedfiles/websiteslides2.4.pdf (last visited July 27, 2021) [hereafter
Northwest in Transition].
16
See Save Our Wild Salmon, Why Remove the 4 Lower Snake River Dams? (n.d.),
https://www.wildsalmon.org/facts-and-information/why-remove-the-4-lower-snake-river-dams.html;
Michael C. Blumm, et. al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon: Simultaneously: The Biological,
Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and
Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997 (1998) (collecting economic and scientific studies as
well as marshalling legal arguments) [hereafter Saving Snake River Salmon and Water]. In 2021, American
Rivers named the Snake River “the most endangered river” in the nation. See American Rivers, America’s
Most
Endangered
Rivers,
2021,
https://www.americanrivers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/MER2021_FINAL_Report_ReducedSize-1-1.pdf; see Jeremy P. Jacobs, Snake
River tops imperiled list as group urges dam removal, GREENWIRE (E&E News, April 13, 2021),
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063729845; Doyle Rice, The Snake River in the Pacific
Northwest is the nation’s ‘most endangered river’ of 2021, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/04/13/most-endangered-rivers-snake-river-tops-listamerican-rivers/7191736002/.
17
In 2016, federal District Judge Michael Simon ruled that the National Marine Fisheries Service’s 2014
biological opinion (BiOp) on 2014-2018 federal hydroelectric operations violated the ESA because it 1)
promised off-site mitigation measures were not reasonably certain to occur; 2) employed an improper
method of evaluating species jeopardy; 3) failed to account for low and declining abundance levels of
spawning salmon, with an adequate margin of safety; and 4) inadequately considered the effects of ongoing
climate change on the promised mitigation measures. The court also ordered the federal agencies operating
the federal hydroelectric system to prepare an EIS on the cumulative effects of operational changes and
reasonable alternatives of existing hydroelectric operations that would better promote the recovery of the
listed salmon. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 950 (D. Or. 2016).
See Michael C. Blumm, Juliane L. Fry & Olivier Jamin, Still Crying Out For a “Major Overhaul” After
All These Years—Salmon and Another Failed Biological Opinion on Columbia Basin Hydroelectric
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Water Act requirements which, if successful, could produce material changes in dam operation to
lower Columbia Basin water temperatures.18
Into this longstanding and complex controversy, Congressman Mike Simpson (R-Idaho)
waded when, in early 2021, he proposed removing the four LSR dams as part of an arresting $33.5
billion package that would ensure that no affected economic interest would suffer any pecuniary

Operations, 47 ENVTL. L. 287, 302-31 (2017) (analyzing Judge Simon’s 2016 opinion) [hereafter cited as
Still Crying Out]. Judge Simon proceeded to order increased spills as an interim in 2017, while the agencies
attempted to comply with their BiOp and EIS requirements. See id. at 324-26. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the spill decision in 2018, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2018).
See Michael C. Blumm & Doug DeRoy, The Fight Over Columbia Basin Salmon Spills and the Future of
the Lower Snake River Dams, 9 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY. 1, 9-13 (2019) [hereafter The Fight Over
Salmon Spills]. In 2020, the federal government’s EIS in response to the court’s order rejected dam
breaching and is now under judicial challenge by environmental groups. See Fishing, Conservation Groups
Take Step to Renew Legal Challenge to Columbia-Snake Hydropower Operations, EARTHJUSTICE (Oct. 23,
2020),
https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2020/fishing-conservation-groups-take-step-to-renew-legalchallenge-to-columbia-snake-hydropower-operations.
18
See infra § V.
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losses, and that litigation over the issue would cease for 35 years.19 Simpson’s proposal drew
opposition from both economic and environmental groups20 and scant support in Congress.21

19

See infra § VI; Jeremy P. Jacobs, Republican Wants to Breach Dams, Reshape Pacific Northwest, E &
E News (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www-eenews-net.library.lcproxy.org/eedaily/stories/1063724579/. As of
this writing, it’s not clear how broadly the litigation moratorium would apply; Jacques Leslie, Op-Ed: Listen
Up: A Republican says we have to breach the four Snake River dams, LOS ANGELES TIMES (March 10,
2021), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-03-10/snake-river-dams-demolition-mike-simpsonidaho-washington. For an interview with Congressman Simpson about his proposal, see Chuck Thompson,
‘The Stars are aligned: Rep. Mike Simpson breaks dow plan to breach Snake River dams, COLUMBIA
INSIGHT (Feb. 25, 2021), https://columbiainsight.org/the-stars-are-aligned-rep-mike-simpson-breaksdown-plan-to-breach-snake-river-dams/.
20
Nineteen environmental groups signed a statement opposing the proposal. See Wild Fish Conservancy,
Why Your Organization Needs to Know About the “Simpson Concept” to Breach the Lower Four Snake
River Dams: Proposal would exchange breaching dams for suspending bedrock environmental laws,
https://wildfishconservancy.org/why-your-organization-needs-to-know-about-the-201csimpsonconcept201d-to-breach-the-lower-four-snake-river-dams. See also Annette Carry, ‘Risky Proposition.’ Can
$33 Billion Make Up Loss of Snake River Dams? Tri-Cities Group Leery, TRI-CITY HERALD (Feb. 7, 2021),
https://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/local/article248998910.html; Eric Barker, Some Environmentalists
Raise Objections to Simpson Dam Plan. This is the Biggest Reason, IDAHO STATESMAN (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.eastidahonews.com/2021/03/some-environmentalists-raise-objections-to-simpson-dam-planthis-is-the-biggest-reason/ (explaining that some environmental groups have opposed the Simpson proposal
because of the 35-year moratorium on Clean Water Act (CWA) and Endangered Spices Act (ESA) litigation
it would impose).
21
As of this writing, Congressman Earl Blumenauer (D-Or.) was the sole member of Congress to voice
support for Simpson’s proposal. Blumenauer along with Simpson appeared in a virtual town hall to speak
on the matter. See Eric Barker, Idaho Republican, Oregon Democrat Agree on Salmon. ‘Let’s Put Away
Our
Pitchforks’,
IDAHO
STATESMAN
(May
05,
2021),
https://www.idahostatesman.com/article251184424.html. Oregon Governor Kate Brown (D-Or.) has also
expressed her support. Nigel Jaquiss, Idaho Republican Congressman Lays out Framework for Removal of
Four
Lower
Snake
River
Dams,
WILLAMETTE
WEEK
(Feb.
8,
2021),
https://www.wweek.com/news/2021/02/07/idaho-republican-congressman-lays-out-framework-forremoval-of-four-snake-river-dams/; Jeremy P. Jacobs, Ore. Governor urges removal of four disputed dam,
GREENWIRE (E&E News, Feb. 18, 2020, https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1062385429.
Opposition was, however, widespread from Washington’s elected officials. Republican Congresswoman
Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.) and Congressman Dan Newhouse (R-Wash.) opposed the Simpson
proposal. See Nicholas K. Geranios, Feud Breaks Out Among GOP Lawmakers over Snake River Dams,
OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (May 6, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/05/06/northwest-goplawmakers-feud-snake-river-dams/ (representing districts that, combined, contain all four of the LSR
dams). Washington’s Governor Jay Inslee (D-Wash.) and both of the state’s U.S. Senators, Maria Cantwell
(D-Wash.) and Patty Murray (D-Wash.), announced their opposition, on the grounds that the plan could not
be included in the upcoming infrastructure package working its way through Congress, as well as wanting
to see a plan that was the product of a regional coalition. See Lynda V. Mapes, Gov. Inslee, Washington
State’s U.S. Senators Reject GOP Congressman’s Pitch on Lower Snake River Dam Removal, SEATTLE
TIMES (May 14, 2021), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/gov-inslee-washingtonstates-u-s-senators-reject-gop-congressmans-pitch-on-lower-snake-river-dam-removal/.
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This paper discusses the origins of the controversy over the LSR dams, the longstanding
and ongoing court challenges, and the remarkable Simpson proposal. Section I provides some
historical background, beginning with the Corps’ river basin studies of the 1920s and continuing
through the 1940s congressional authorizations and the completion of the dams in the early 1980s.
Section II turns to the adverse effects of the dams on migrating salmon. Sections III and IV explain
the attempted restoration efforts under the Northwest Power Act and the ESA over the past forty
years, neither of which has met with much success. Section V discusses ongoing efforts to use the
Clean Water Act to lower river temperatures to make streams in the Columbia Basin, especially
the Snake River, less lethal for salmon. Section VI examines the Simpson proposal in some detail,
including its staggering price tag. The paper concludes that unlike the planned removal of dams
in the Klamath River Basin in northern California—seemingly quite possible in the next few
years22—removal of the LSR dams faces long odds that will require, at a minimum, widespread
recognition by the Idaho public and its elected representatives of the significant economic gains
they would experience from the out-of-state LSR dam removal. If the Simpson proposal generates
debate among Idahoans of the costs and benefits of LSR dam removal, it will have served a
substantial public function.
I. The Construction of the Lower Snake River Dams
Small dams have been built on the Snake River since white settlers began moving to the
region via the Oregon Trail in the 19th century.23 But the idea of the federal government
damming the Columbia Basin did not surface until a 1931 Army Corps of Engineers report,
authorized by the River and Harbor Act of 1925,24 recommended construction of ten dams on the

22

See infra s. VII.
See Shallat, supra note 1.
24
H.R. DOC. NO. 103, 73rd Congress, 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (the reports were completed in 1931, but did not
reach the Congressional Record until later). These studies, referred to as “308 reports,” after H.R. DOC. NO.
23
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mainstem Columbia River.25 In the 1930s, after dams became a form of “conservation” favored
by the Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal,26 the Corps revised its Columbia Basin plan in
1938 to focus on the Lower Snake.27 The prodigious Snake River salmon runs, the largest in the
Columbia Basin at the time,28 would never be the same after Congress authorized the dams that
the Corps’ plan recommended.
The Corps’ 1938 turn from the Columbia to the Snake amounted to a shift from an
emphasis on hydropower generation to navigation, in recognition of the apparent lack of markets
for the hydropower being generated by the Bonneville Dam and would soon come from the
massive Grand Coulee project, and also a response to persistent lobbying by shipping and
agricultural interests who sought a slack-water navigation channel linking Lewiston to the ocean.29
Their lobbying succeeded perhaps beyond the proponents’ wildest dreams, for despite a cost-

308, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1926), that called for them, have been periodically updated by the Corps
of Engineers.
25
For the history of development on the Lower Snake, see KEITH C. PETERSEN & MARY E. REED,
CONTROVERSY, CONFLICT, AND COMPROMISE: A HISTORY OF LOWER SNAKE RIVER DEVELOPMENT
(Walla Walls Dist., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1994); KEITH PETERESEN, RIVER OF LIFE, CHANNEL
OF DEATH: FISH AND DAMS ON THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER (OSU Press, 2001); STEPHEN HAWLEY,
RECOVERING A LOST RIVER: REMOVING DAMS, REWILDING SALMON, REVITALIZING COMMUNITIES
(Beacon Press, 2011) see also Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Columbia
Basin’s Anadromous Fish for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11
ENVTL. L. 211, 224-26 (1981) [hereinafter Hydropower vs. Salmon].
26
See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, RIGHTFUL HERITAGE: FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE LAND OF
AMERICA 571 (2016) (observing that FDR’s affinity for creating dams tarnished his conservation legacy,
and that his interest in promoting public power to compete with private utility power caused him to view
projects like the Grand Coulee Dam and the Tennessee Valley Authority as “holy causes”), reviewed in
Michael C. Blumm, The Nation’s First Forester-in-Chief: The Overlooked Role of FDR and the
Environment, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 25, 58 (2017) (FDR’s “monumental environmental legacy, it is
true, is undermined by his attachment to dams and the hydropower and irrigation they brought”).
27
See id. at 229; see also Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho’s Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious
Future, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 672 (1991-92) [hereafter Saving Idaho’s Salmon].
28
See Rocky Barker & Brittany Peterson, Fate of Pacific Northwest Orca Tied to Having Enough Columbia
River Salmon, IDAHO STATESMAN (July 9, 2017) https://www.idahostatesman.com/article160452294.html.
29
Saving Idaho’s Salmon, supra note 27, at 672.

9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897106

benefit ratio—by the Corps’ own figures—of fifteen cents on the dollar.30 Congress in 1944
decided to authorize “such dams as are necessary” on the Lower Snake,31and thereafter funded the
construction and operation of the four LSR dams on the basis of an authorization that did not even
mention them by name.
The 1944 authorization of the dams not only aimed to provide a navigation channel for
agricultural products on the Snake, it created construction jobs for returning servicemen, thus
combatting what Congress feared would be a post-war recession.32 The Corps opted to construct
four dams33 which, somewhat astonishingly, made Lewiston, Idaho—465 miles from the Pacific
Ocean—a deep-water port, thereby transforming the Lower Snake into a completely artificial
environment suited for slack-water barge navigation.
II. The Onset of the Salmon Crisis
Even while the LSR dams were under construction, Snake River salmon were going into a
tailspin from which they have never recovered.34 Congress was not unaware of the problems that

30

See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE
OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON SACRIFICING THE SALMON 96-97 (2002) [hereafter cited as SACRIFICING
THE SALMON] (citing H.R. Doc. No. 704, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 10 (1938)).
31

River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, s. 2, 59 Stat.10, 21, discussed in Saving Idaho’s Salmon, supra
note 27, at 672-673.
32
See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 25, at 223.
33
Construction of the LSR dams, all of which are in Washington, took many years. The Corps completed
Ice Harbor Dam, the lowest on the river near the town of Burbank, in 1961. The agency finished Lower
Monumental Dam, situated in a remote area of Walla Walla and Franklin counties, in 1969. Little Goose
Dam near the town of Starbuck, came on line in 1970. Finally, Lower Granite, crossing Whitman and
Garfield counties, was not operational until 1975, due to budget cuts occasioned by the funding of the
Vietnam War. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 104 (2002). However, after going on line,
all the dams added generators post-operation, so their construction was not actually completed until the
early 1980s. See supra note 11.
34
The “smolt to adult return” (SAR) rate, a key reflection of the health of a salmon run, declined
precipitously after the dams went online in the 1970s. Whereas SAR rates for wild Snake River spring
chinook averaged 4.38% during the late 1960s (1964-69), by the mid-1970s and early 1980s the average
SAR rate was 1.2% (1976-83), a decline of over 350%. See Howard L. Raymond, Effects of Hydroelectric
Development and Fisheries Enhancement on Spring and Summer Chinook Salmon and Steelhead in the
Columbia River Basin, 8(1) N. AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 1 (1988). Wild Snake River summer chinook SAR
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the dams presented for migrating salmon, for the same statute which cavalierly authorized the LSR
dams, without actually mentioning them, also authorized construction of McNary Dam, just below
the confluence of the Snake and Columbia Rivers. In the McNary authorization Congress
stipulated that the Corps “[i]n the design, construction, and operation of the dam adequate
provision shall be made for the protection of anadromous fish by affording free access to their
natural spawning grounds and other appropriate means.”35
One might have thought that the Corps would interpret this congressional directive to
establish a policy priority for successful fish passage in the operation of not only McNary Dam
but dams upstream, like the LSR dams, to ensure vibrant spawning salmon runs. The agency never
did. Even though a revised Corps of Engineers’ plan in 1950 expressly promised “[c]onservation
of salmon to the maximum practical extent” and “minimum interference . . . with fish and wildlife
habitat,”36 these were empty promises, at least in terms of operating the dams to facilitate fish
migration. Instead, for decades beginning in the 1950s, the Corps, the principal federal operator
of Columbia Basin dams, including the LSR dams, chose to emphasize hydropower production
over salmon migration. The operative assumption was that dam-related losses could be offset
through hatchery production,37 an assumption that was not only erroneous, hatchery reliance
turned out to be a Faustian bargain, damaging to wild salmon spawning.38 Since the completion of

rates experienced a similar decline, going from an average of 4.2% in the late 1960s (1964-69) to less than
1.1% in the period 1976-83. Id.
35
River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 22 (also directing the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
to conduct “studies and surveys necessary for fish protection” and required installation of fish protection
structures and facilities). See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 25, at 234.
36
H.R. Doc. No. 531, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 41-42. Minimum flows for fish were also mentioned. Id. at
app. P at 2901 (calling for minimum flows below Hungry House Dam). See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra
note 25, at 232, 236.
37
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 97.
38
See id. at 127 (explaining that traditional hatchery operations not only have not been unable to recover
lost salmon due to dams, they also have damaged salmon runs due a loss of genetic diversity, overuse of
remaining habitat, disease, and overharvesting wild salmon in mixed stock fisheries).
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the Lower Snake River dams, every Snake River salmon species has either gone extinct or is
threatened with extinction.39
III. The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
By the 1970s, with Columbia River salmon in severe decline,40 the federal National Marine
Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) began a status review of the
suitability of Columbia Basin salmon for listing under the Endangered Species Act.41 At the same
time, the Northwest was experiencing electric power crisis, due in large part to poor investments
by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in ill-fated nuclear power plants.42 The 1980
Northwest congressional delegation succeeded in getting Congress to pass the Northwest Power
Act43 revising the region’s electric policies, creating an interstate council whose plans redirected
the region away from nuclear and fossil-fuel electric power and toward conservation and
renewable energy, and saving the region billions in the process.44 But perhaps even more
remarkable was the statute’s provisions called for fish and wildlife restoration “to the extent

39

IDAHO DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, IDAHO’S ANADROMOUS FISH STOCKS: THEIR
STATUS AND RECOVERY OPTIONS 16 (1998).
40
See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 25, at 215:
For example, in 1975 upriver spring chinook fishing was prohibited throughout the entire
Columbia [River] for the first time in history. That same year, the spring chinook fishery on the
Snake was closed. Recreational steelhead fishing on the Columbia and Snake and their
tributaries was banned in both 1975 and 1976. The 1979 spring chinook run was the lowest on
record, and the summer and fall chinook, coho, sockeye, and steelhead runs were all well below
the ten-year average.
41
43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978). See F. Lorraine Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the
Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349 (1980).
42
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 103-06 (describing the rise and fall of the so-called
Hydro-Thermal Power Program).
43
16 U.S.C. § 839.
44
The Northwest Power and Conservation Council estimates that ratepayers had saved $4.44 billion during
1980 to 2018 due to the Northwest Power Act. See Energy Efficiency, NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION
COUNCIL, https://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/energy-topics/energy-efficiency (last visited Jul. 28, 2021).
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affected” by the federal system of Columbia Basin dams, including the LSR dams.45 This directive
led to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council’s Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, a program that remains a significant part of salmon restoration efforts to this day.46 The
program established a goal of doubling the basin’s salmon runs,47 a goal that appeared realistic
until it became clear in the late 1980s that all the expected run size increases were due to hatchery
production, and the adverse effects of hatchery fish on wild spawning salmon were becoming
widely known.48 The program has since included genetic standards for its funding of hatcheries,49
but doubling the numbers of spawning salmon, given existing hydroelectric operations, now
appears to be unrealistic.
The Council’s program never had much of an effect on federal hydroelectric operations.
Although the statute aimed to give the interstate council some authority over the federal agencies
operating the hydroelectric system, its enforcement provisions were ambiguous,50 and the Council

45

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A). The story behind the evolution of the fish and wildlife restoration ordered
by the statute is briefly explained in SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 131 (discussing the
decisive role of Congressman John Dingell).
46
See NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 20TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST
GOVERNORS 4-5 (2021) (noting that in fiscal year 2020, the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
spent $238.1 million on direct program costs, and BPA counted $611.5 million in costs, including what the
agency considers “foregone benefits” due to measures like spills at dams to facilitate salmon passage; also
observing that BPA’s fish and wildlife division allegedly consumes 23.8% of BPA’s total costs).
47
The Council established the doubling goal in the 1987 amendments to the Columbia Basin program. NW.
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 34 (1987).
48
Hatchery fish have played a part in many efforts to restore salmon populations with varied results. An
early attempt to raise the size of steelhead runs in Washington resulted in a decrease in population. See B.
Crawford, The Origin and History of Trout Brood Stocks of the Washington Department of Game 10 (1979).
A study from the 1980s concluded that the SAR of hatchery fish was four to five times lower than that of
their wild counterparts. J. Mullan, Status and Propagation of Chinook Salmon in the Mid-Columbia River
Through 1985 94 (1987). For an analysis of early studies of the issues with hatchery fish, see Michael L.
Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call for Federal Regulation of Hatchery
Programs, 20 ENVTL. L. 111, (1990).
49
NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM
2014: 2020 ADDENDUM 17-20, 29 (2020).
50
16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (the Bonneville Power Administration must act “consistent” with the
Council’s program), § 839b(h)(11)(a)(ii) (federal water management agencies must “take the program into
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proved unwilling to test those directives in court.51 The upshot was that the Northwest Power Act
did not challenge the status quo, causing no major changes in Columbia Basin dam operations,
including the LSR dams.52
IV. The Endangered Species Salmon Listings
One response to the Columbia Basin Program’s inability to restructure river flows and
hydroelectric operations were petitions filed by the Shoshone-Bannock tribe and others to list
several salmon species under the ESA. The petitions prompted Oregon Sen. Mark Hatfield to in
1990 convene a so-called “Salmon Summit” among major river users in a fruitless attempt to ward
off the listings. Not surprisingly, the meetings were unable to produce a plan to avert the listings,
but they did generate a noteworthy contribution: Idaho Gov. Cecil Andrus’ proposed seasonal
drawdowns of Snake River reservoirs by 25-feet or more to facilitate salmon migration.53
Congressman Simpson’s 2021 proposal is in effect a permanent, not a seasonal reservoir
drawdown. Meanwhile, in response to the ESA petitions, the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife and the federal NMFS produced an alarming status report that showed, for example, that

account to the maximum extent feasible”); § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i) (federal water agencies must act in a manner
that gives “equitable treatment” to both the fish and the hydropower).
51
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 139, 144-45 (discussing some institutional limitations
of the interstate Council, a body of politically-appointed state officials). There was some litigation over the
Council’s program, however. Environmentalists sued the Council’s program, as amended in 1991, for
deviating from recommended measures submitted by regional fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Council impermissibly failed to defer to recommended measures
concerning setting biological objectives and establishing river flows, and instead continuing to rely on the
Corps of Engineers trucking and barging program for juvenile salmon. See id. at 146-48 (discussing
Northwest Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994)) (ruling
that the Council could not reject a recommended fish and wildlife measure “solely because it will result in
power losses and economic costs . . . .” id. at 1389).
52
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 134-40 (discussing, among other things, the Council’s
“water budget,” which was routinely ignored or undermined by federal operating agencies).
53
See id. at 174.
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Salmon River chinook were only at six percent of their run-size thirty years before.54 The ESA
listings soon followed.55
The ESA listings triggered federal consultation procedures to ensure against species
jeopardy and prohibitions against the unpermitted takings of listed species.56 The chief procedure
is a biological opinion (BiOp) from federal fish and wildlife agencies (in the case of salmon,
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the principal agency), and the ESA era has seen
multiple BiOps on federal hydroelectric project operations over the last two decades, all but one
of which courts have held violated the ESA.57 Despite the consistent judicial rebukes, the federal
agencies operating the dams made remarkably few operational changes before 2017. Then, Judge
Michael Simon ordered increased interim spills to increase salmon passage at the federal dams,
including at the LSR dams.58 The federal dam operators challenged that directive in the Ninth
Circuit, but that court quickly affirmed Judge Simon’s injunction.59 The result was the biggest

54

See id. In 1991, the American Fisheries Society’s Endangered Species Committee published a coastwide
status report that revealed a broader salmon crisis, extending considerably beyond the Columbia and Snake
Rivers; the report showed 101 species of spawning salmon at “a high rate of extinction.” Willa Nehlsen,
Jack Williams & Jim Lichatowhich, Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk from California,
Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES no. 2, at 4 (1991).
55
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 175; see id. at 177 (noting the importance of citizen
petitions in triggers the ESA listing process).
56
See, e.g., Katherine Renshaw, Leaving the Fox to Guard the Henhouse: Bringing Accountability to
Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 177-85 (2007) (outlining
the consultation process under the ESA, including jeopardy avoidance, takings prohibition, and the
production of BiOps from consulting agencies like FWS and NMFS).
57
The sorry tale is told in a series of articles; two of the latest were: Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorsen
& Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery
Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006) (reviewing four hydroelectric BiOps issued
between 1992 and 2004, with detailed analysis of the 2004 BiOp and some associated federal actions that
undermined salmon recovery); Still Crying Out, supra note 17, at 302-18 (reviewing the 2008 BiOp, as
amended in 2010, and the 2014 BiOp).
58
See Still Crying Out, supra note 17, at 324-26 (discussing Judge Simon’s spill decision).
59
See supra note 17 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of Judge Simon’s spill decision). Judge
Simon also ordered the federal operating agencies to examine the effects of current dam operations and
reasonable alternatives in a programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS). Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, v.
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F.Supp.3d 861, 937-48 (D. Or. 2016). But in the ensuing 2020 EIS the
agencies rejected dam breaching or substantial changes in project operations. See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Pacific

15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897106

change in the federal hydroelectric system that the ESA produced since the listings a quartercentury earlier.
V. The Clean Water Act
Increased spill increases the cost of status quo hydroelectric operations.60

So will

implementation of the Clean Water Act,61 an emerging issue of some significance. The statute
requires establishment of water quality standards to, among other things, protect the propagation
fish and wildlife.62 One of the chief means of achieving this goal in salmon country is through the
setting and enforcing temperature standards, since water temperatures in the LSR reservoirs are
often lethal for salmon and increasing due to climate change.63 Enforcing water quality standards

Northwest salmon review is ‘Groundhog Day’ to greens, E&E News (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/news/e-e-news-pacific-northwest-salmon-review-isgroundhog-day-to-greens.html.
60
In late 2018, BPA, BoR, the Corps, Oregon, and Washington reached an agreement as to how to manage
the court ordered spills, which Judge Simon approved. See Save our Wild Salmon, CBB: NOAA Releases
New 2019 BiOp for Columbia Basin Salmon/Steelhead; Includes Flexible Spill (April 2, 2019),
https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/news/cbb-noaa-releases-new-2019-biop-for-columbiabasin-salmon-steelhead-includes-flexible-spill.html (noting the filing of the agreement to Judge Simon’s
court), and see U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS ET AL., 2019-2021 SPILL OPERATION AGREEMENT (2018)
(the agreement itself which notes that the plaintiffs will not challenge it unless circumstances change or the
agreement is broken). The basic premise of the agreement was spills at the dam would that sixteen-hour
spills would occur when power demand was low, but when prices were higher, less water was spilled to
increase power demands. The agreement sought to keep average costs the same for ratepayers, and not to
exceed $40 million. See Bonneville Power Admin., Federal Agencies Spill Record Amount of Water at
Dams
(June
9,
2020),
https://www.bpa.gov/news/newsroom/Pages/
Federal%20agencies%20spill%20record%20amount%20of%20water%20at%20dams.aspx. In spring
2020, this arrangement meant that when spills occurred, the LSR dams spilled 80-90% of water flowing
downriver, while their lower Columbia River counterparts spilled 40-75%. Id. During the first two years of
the agreement, BPA increased revenues by $4.7 million, although it is not clear that this magnitude of
savings can be sustained into the future. See Hydro Review Content Directors, 2019-2021 Flexible Spill
Agreement for Pacific Northwest Dams was Successful, HYDRO REVIEW (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.hydroreview.com/environmental/2019-2021-flexible-spill-agreement-for-pacific-northwestdams-was-successful/#gref.
61
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
62
Id. § 1313(c)(1); 40 C.F.R. s. 130.3; see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS HANDBOOK, CHAPTER 3: WATER QUALITY CRITERIA 14-15,
24-25 (2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-10/documents/handbook-chapter3.pdf.
63
See Michael C. Blumm & Michael Benjamin Smith, Salmon and the Clean Water Act: An Unfinished
Agenda, 51 ENVTL. L. REP. (ELI) 10109, 10110-12 (2021) [hereafter Salmon and Clean Water].
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is, however, complicated, requiring the establishment of “total maximum daily loads” (TMDLs),
which then can be applied to discrete dischargers like federal dams.64 States are the primary
vehicles for establishing TMDLs, but the states of Oregon and Washington declined to do so for
the Columbia and Snake Rivers, so the federal EPA was forced to do so under court order.65 The
resulting TMDL in 2020 revealed that temperatures in the Columbia and Snake Rivers were far in
excess of water quality standards in both states, as much as 5.8 F in the Snake.66 Since the TMDL
limited the collective increase of 0.18 F, the dams had exceeded the TMDL considerably.
Enforceable water quality standards through TMDLs could thus significantly improve
prospects for salmon recovery by requiring substantial changes in hydroelectric operations. But
enforcement is complex, as TMDL limits are not enforceable directly, absent a discharge from a
point source. Although EPA exempted dam operations from permit requirements long ago, dams
in fact discharge hundreds of gallons of oils and other lubricants, and those discharges trigger
permit requirements.67 Federally issued permits in turn require certification of compliance with
state water quality standards under section 401 of the Clean Water Act.68 However, in response
to Washington’s 401 certification requiring compliance with the temperature TMDL, the Trump
Administration challenged the TMDL, claiming it was inconsistent with federal law requiring the

64

Dams discharge oil and other lubricants. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
Columbia River Riverkeeper v. Wheeler, 944 F.3d 1204, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2019) (where the states failed
to develop a temperature TMDL, EPA had a duty to do so, rejecting the argument that the states could
evade the duty to promulgate a TMDL through inaction). See Salmon and Clean Water supra note 63, at
10112. Washington complained that EPA’s TMDL was like EPA telling the dam operators to diet, but
without prescribing a specific diet. See Kelly Ferron and Stacy Galleher, EPA Plan for Washington and
Oregon Rivers Leaves Salmon in Hot Water, WASHINGTON STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY (Aug. 19, 2020)
https://ecology.wa.gov/Blog/Posts/August-2020/EPA-plan-for-Washington-and-Oregon-rivers-leaves-s.
The Corps operated dams in Washington were 401-certified with the inclusion of EPA’s TMDL standards,
however the Corps has appealed these certifications objecting to the inclusion of the TMDL. See id.
66
See Salmon and Clean Water, supra note 63, at 10112.
67
See id. at 10113 (discussing settlement agreements between Columbia Riverkeeper and federal dam
operators).
68
33 U.S.C § 1341.
65
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dams to be operated to fulfill their authorized purposes. 69 Whether the Biden Administration will
pursue this appeal is not clear as of this writing.70
Enforceable water quality standards, when combined with increased spills to facilitate
salmon passage at the dams, making it so expensive to operate projects like the LSR dams that it
will become considerably cheaper to simply breach or remove the dams than maintain them in
compliance with existing federal laws. Breaching the LSR dams may thus become more overtly
a taxpayer subsidy issue.
VI. The Simpson Proposal
Congressman Mike Simpson’s $33.5 billion plan to breach the LSR dams, released in
February 2021, reignited the debate over breaching the dams.71 Although the idea of breaching

69

See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, No. P20-043c (Wash. Pollution Control
Hearings Bd. June 8, 2020), discussed in Salmon and Clean Water, supra note 63, at 10114,
70
The impetus for the Trump Administration’s changes to section 401 regulations began with the denial by
Washington of water quality certification for a coal export terminal, the Millennium Bulk TerminalLongview project, in 2017. In the Matter of Denying Section 401 Water Certification to Millennium Bulk
Terminal-Longview, LLC, Order #15417 (State of Washington Dep’t of Ecology 2017. In response to this
denial, as well as other high-profile denials by other states, President Trump issued an executive order
calling for the Administrator of EPA to release new regulations on section 401 certifications. See Exec.
Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019). EPA promulgated did new rules in 2020. See Clean
Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42210 (July 13, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 121). The new Trump rules limited the time frame for a state 401 certification decision from the state to
one year, applied the certification to only “discharges” into navigable waters, not to “activities,” and limited
a state’s ability to impose conditions to state and tribal regulations. See Peter Kalicki, Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act from Trump to Biden, HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Jan. 25,
2021), https://eelp.harvard.edu/2021/01/section-401-of-the-clean-water-act-from-trump-to-biden/. The
new 401 rules drew several lawsuits. See, e.g., American Rivers v. Wheeler, No. 20-04636 (N.D. Cal. filed
Jul. 13, 2020). However, the Biden Administration intends to reverse the Trump 401 rule changes, perhaps
mooting the litigation. See Hannah Northay, EPA to Redo Trump Rule Curbing State Say on Energy
Projects, E&E News (May 27, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063733711. As for the Millennium
Bulk Terminal project, that appears to be dead after a lawsuit by Montana and Wyoming challenging the
401 certification denial failed to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, and the company
sponsoring the project having gone bankrupt in the interim. See Mead Gruver, Justices Deny Wyoming,
Montana Coal Suit Against Washington State, SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 28, 2021),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/northwest/supreme-court-denies-wyoming-montana-lawsuitagainst-longview-coal-terminal/.
71
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 9. Although Rep. Simpson expressed interest in having
the plan be a part of the Biden Administration’s proposed trillion-dollar infrastructure bill working through
Congress, the plan was not included in the bipartisan agreement reached in late June 2021 and seems
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the dams is at least a quarter-century old,72 the Simpson proposal began in 2018 with a series of
meeting with regional stakeholders, including federal and state agencies, tribes, and interest
groups.73 In all, Simpson held over 300 meetings.74 Nonetheless, some regional politicians have
claimed their opposition to his proposal is based on a lack of public outreach.75 On the other hand,
tribes have been pressuring other regional politicians and President Biden to support the measure.76
This section briefly outlines the principal elements of the Simpson proposal. They include
breaching the dams and associated river improvements, replacement of lost power, community
compensation and development, and extended hydroelectric licenses, management changes, and a
lawsuit moratorium.
A. Breaching the LSR Dams and Associated River Improvements
The Simpson plan is headlined by the breaching of the four LSR River dams. The plan
would establish a $33.5 billion “Columbia Basin Fund” to carry out the various programs and other
projects for which the plan calls.77 A special administrator in the federal Department of Energy,

unlikely to be included in the future without bipartisan agreement among Northwest congressional
representatives, among whom there is substantial Republican opposition. See infra note 75.
72
See Saving Snake River Salmon and Water, supra note 16.
73
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 2.
74
See id.
75
A March 2021 joint statement by Reps. Cliff Bentz (R-Or.), Dan Newhouse (R-Wash.), and Cathy
McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.) accused Simpson of working with Oregon Governor Kate Brown’s (D-Or.)
office “under wraps and out of the public eye.” See Orion Donovan-Smith, Newhouse, McMorris Rodgers
Slam Simpson for Coordinating with Oregon Governor on Dam-Breaching Proposal, THE SPOKESMANREVIEW (May 6, 2021), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2021/may/06/newhouse-mcmorris-rodgersslam-simpson-for-coordin/. Newhouse and Mc Morris Rodgers have introduced a bill that would modernize
dams, including the LSR dams, in response to Simpson’s plan. See Courtney Flatt, Dan Newhouse, Cathy
McMorris Rodgers Seek to Boost Hydropower After Idaho Rep's Dam Removal Idea, NW NEWS NETWORK
(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/energy/2021-03-05/dan-newhouse-cathy-mcmorrisrodgers-seek-to-boost-hydropower-after-idaho-reps-dam-removal-idea.
76
See Lynda V. Mapes, Historic summit of tribes across Pacific Northwest presses dam removal on Inslee,
Biden,
Congress,
Seattle Times
(Jul.
9,
2021),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/environment/historic-summit-of-tribes-across-pacific-northwest-presses-dam-removal-on-insleebiden-congress/ (fifteen Northwest tribes endorsed dam removal and called for another summit in
Washington, D.C.).
77
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 11.
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headquartered in the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington, would
distribute the money.78
The plan envisions breaching the dams in 2030 and 2031, at an estimated cost of $1.4
billion,79 only about four percent of the $33.5 billion of the total price tag of the Simpson proposal.
Simpson envisions numerous post-breaching projects, including nearly $400 million for a Corpsadministered sediment-control program to mitigate expected damage associated with the
downriver release of sediments accumulated over the years behind the dams. 80 Also proposed is
a $500 million dam indemnification program for other public and private Columbia Basin dam
owners who voluntarily remove their dams.81 Further, Simpson's plan would establish a $150
million fund for waterfront restoration in Lewiston and Clarkston, Washington.82 There is also $3
billion in watershed improvement funds set aside for several areas in the Columbia River Basin.83
B. Replacement Power
The LSR dams currently produce around four percent of the electric power of the Pacific
Northwest.84 The Simpson plan proposes to replace the lost power with a variety of sources,

78

See id.
See id. at 12.
80
See id. at 13. In addition to managing damage the sediment caused by releasing the accumulated
sediments behind the dams, the Corps would also study how to manage the additional sediments flowing
downstream from the river upstream of the LSR dams. Id.
81
See id. at 18. The plan points to the Enloe dam as an example of a dam that could be removed through
this fund. See id. In 2019, the Okanogan Public Utility District (PUD) voted to abandon the dam, which has
not produced electricity since 1958. See Lynda V. Mapes, A Dam Blocking 348 Miles of Salmon Streams
Hasn’t Generated Electricity Since 1958. But Who Will Take It Down?, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/a-dam-blocking-348-miles-of-salmon-streamshasnt-generated-electricity-since-1958-but-who-will-take-it-down/ (noting that Okanogan PUD cannot
afford to remove the inoperative dam to help restore salmon populations in the Similkameen River).
82
See id. at 15. Clarkston, Washington, across the river from Lewiston, is part of the Lewiston metropolitan
area.
83
Need cite.
84
Need cite.
79
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calling for a $10 billion grant program to fund clean power replacements.85 Judicially required
spills from dams has become a fixture in the ESA litigation over the Columbia Basin dam
operations,86 during which the dams’ hydropower production has been curtailed. Simpson would
establish a $4 billion program for BPA or a different entity to replace that power from new “noncarbon” sources to replace the lost hydropower due salmon spills.87 In all, the Simpson proposal
would include some $14 billion for energy replacement, an amount ten times the cost of dam
removal.88
The proposal would fund an increase the electric grid’s storage and transmission
capabilities, authorizing $2 billion for transmission line replacements and upgrades to bring the
replacement power to market.89 Simpson would make also make $1.25 billion available for Pacific

85

But see infra note 88, on the likely inflated cost of replacement power. The proposal defines “clean
power” as increased storage, increased transmission lines, or other measures not specified in the plan but
approved by BPA or the Northwest Power and Conservation Council. See id. at 14.
86
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS ET AL., 2019-2021 SPILL OPERATION AGREEMENT 6 (2018)
(establishing spill levels at the dams as a result of an agreement among the parties in the ESA litigation),
as explained supra note 60, in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s approval of Judge Simon’s spill injunction.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 886 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2018), discussed in The
Fight Over Spills, supra note 17, at 105-13 (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Judge Simon’s
2016 decision to require spills over the dams to the maximum level allowed by state law).
87
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 15.
88
There is a lack of consensus on how to replace the lost power, and how much would be needed. Simpson’s
proposal sets aside $14 billion for replacement power. See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at
14-15. This figure is almost surely a considerable overestimate perhaps as much as $10 billion. The Corps’
2020 EIS estimated the cost of replacement power at between $1.45-$2.8 billion, depending on the source
of the replacement power. NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, et al., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEMS
OPERATIONS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-867, tbl.3-114 (2020). A 2018 study
commissioned by the Northwest Energy Coalition estimated the annual cost at between $396 million to
$1.2 billion, based on the kinds of power infrastructure necessary. Nw. Energy Coalition, Lower Snake
River Dam Energy Replacement Study, 76, tbl.16 (2018) https://nwenergy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/LSRD_Report_Full_Final.pdf (exploring a broad range of energy replacement
portfolios, such as all gas or a mix of renewables and natural gas and predicting a monthly average increase
of $1-4 to customers’ bills for the replacement energy in all portfolios imagined by the study. Id. However,
a 2018 report suggested there is no actual need to replace the lost power because between 2007 and 2018,
BPA needed power from the LSR dams for just two hours in 2009 to meet preference customer load
demand. Anthony Jones & Linwood Laughy, Bonneville Power Administration and the Lower Snake River
Dams: The Folly of Conventional Wisdom, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ECONOMETRICS 4 (June 2018),
http://www.rmecon.com/examples/BPA%20&%20LSRDs%206-5-18.pdf.
89
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 16.
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Northwest National Laboratory led research and development of new electric storage capabilities
to capture increased power from solar, wind and hydropower projects.90
C. Community Compensation and Development
Breaching the LSR dams would produce varying effects on the communities along the
Lower Snake River. Lewiston, Idaho may be the most affected community, with the lost deepwater port.

The Simpson plan envisions a waterfront restoration fund for the Lewiston

metropolitan area that would reduce the risk of flooding due Lower Granite dam operations91 and
also an economic development fund for both the Lewiston area and for Tri-Cities in Washington.92
For the agriculture industry, Simpson would supply $1.2 billion in incentives available to dairies,
farms, and concentrated animal feeding operations to clean up their waste discharges into rivers.93
To spur tourism related to Snake Basin salmon restoration, the plan also calls for $325 million to
create the Lower Snake River National Recreation Area, although the proposal does not establish
the boundaries of the proposed NRA.94
The Simpson proposal would address the lost barge transport on the Lower Snake by
creating $1.5 billion in incentives for farmers to use rail or road transport, some of which is
available now within the river corridor.95 Barge traffic will remain available from Tri-Cities,
Washington, and the Simpson proposal would allot $600 million to increase barge capacity there.
More

improvements

in

river

transport

would

come

from

$300

million

for

90

See id. at 22.
The Lewiston flooding is described in Hawley, supra note 25, at 101-33 (2011) (explaining flooding in
Lewiston).
92
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 22.
93
See id. at 21. Simpson also would provide grants to regional state universities for research on the energy
potential of animal waste. Id.
94
See id. at 23 (calling for the NRA to be administered by the Bureau of Land Management and tribal
partners, which would be an unprecedented partnership).
95
See id. at 25.
91

22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897106

“[r]econfiguration/[a]djustment” of the port in Lewiston96 and $1.6 for barge transport
improvements and backlogged maintenance in the Lower Columbia.97 In all, river transport
improvements would cost $4 billion, nearly three times the cost of removing the dams.
D. License Extensions, Management Changes, and Lawsuit Moratorium
Perhaps the most controversial provisions in the Simpson plan concerns potential legal
changes. First are the proposed 35-year extensions of all existing FERC licenses for hydroelectric
in the Columbia Basin producing more than five megawatts.98 It is not clear from the Simpson
proposal how many dams would benefit from this categorical extension, but it would certainly
seem to include large dams like the five public utility district dams on the mid-Columbia as well
as Idaho Power’s numerous Snake Basin dams, including the Hells Canyon complex.99
Presumably, all these extensions would relieve the operators of fish passage requirements under
the Federal Power Act100 and water quality standards under the Clean Water Act;101 both statutes
have fueled a dam removal era throughout the Pacific Northwest.102 The justification for these
extensions, or their relationship to LSR dam breaching, is hardly clear.

96

See id.
See id. at 26.
98
See id. at 17.
99
The five mid-Columbia FERC-licensed dams are Priest Rapids and Wanapum dams, owned and operated
by Grant County PUD, see Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶
61049, 61296 (2008); Rock Island dam, see Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County, Washington 46
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,033, 61,033 (1989); and Rocky Reach dam, see Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan
County, Washington, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61138, 611775 (2009), operated and owned by Chelan County PUD;
and the Wells Dam operated and owned by Douglas County PUD, see Public Utility District No. 1 of
Douglas County, Washington, 141 F.E.R.C ¶ 62104, 64263 (2012). Idaho Power Company operates fifteen
FERC-licensed hydroelectric power plants in the Snake Basin. All of these FERC-licensed projects would
receive new licenses under the Simpson proposal. See Hydroelectric Plants, IDAHO POWER COMPANY,
https://www.idahopower.com/energy-environment/energy/energy-sources/hydroelectric/hydroelectricplants/ (last visited Jul. 12, 2021).
100
16 U.S.C. § 811 (requiring fishways).
101
33 U.S.C. § 1313, discussed supra note 60 and accompanying text.
102
See Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for the
Nation, 42 ENVTL. L. 1043, 1062-66, 1084-96 (2012) [hereinafter Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest]
(highlighting how the fish passage requirements of the Federal Power Act and water quality standard
97
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Another substantial legal change would relieve BPA of its fish management
responsibilities, which would be welcomed by most salmon advocates.103 More ambiguous is the
proposed elimination of fish responsibilities of the Northwest Power and Conservation Council,
which essentially has overseen the formulation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
funded by BPA revenues.104

Simpson would instead would vaguely assign the fish co-

management responsibilities to the states and the region’s Indian tribes.105
The 35-year lawsuit moratorium would halt ongoing lawsuits based on the CWA, the ESA,
and NEPA concerning salmon in the Columbia Basin for thirty-five years.106 This promise, along
with the FERC license extensions, is the most controversial aspect of the Simpson plan beyond the
dam breaching itself. If Congress were to enact the moratorium in 2022, it would extend to 2057,
the equivalent of insulating all Columbia Basin dam operations from change since 1987, before
any ESA salmon listings. The prospect of such an unprecedented insulation of dam operations
from changing environmental conditions and legal requirements for such a long time is alarming.
VII. Comparing the Simpson Proposal to Klamath Dam Removals
The LSR dam removal proposal comes on the heels of another other significant
environmental remediation effort: the proposed removal of four Klamath Basin dams.

This

requirements of the CWA prompted the first steps in the Klamath River removals); see also Salmon and
Clean Water, supra note 63, at 10109.
103
Ben Goldfarb, The Great Salmon Compromise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2014)
https://www.hcn.org/issues/46.21/the-great-salmon-compromise (exploring the Columbia Basin Fish
Accords and the objections to them by many conservationists).
104
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
105
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 31. In many respects Snake River restoration is a
social justice issue. Recognizing the tribe as co-managers of Snake River restoration would be a
considerable advance in the injustice inflicted on tribal salmon harvesters by the construction and
operation of the four LSR dams. See Save Our Wild Salmon, Wild Salmon & Steelhead News (April
2021), https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/newsletters/wild-salmon-steelhead-news-april2021.html. On the federal government’s co-management responsibilities., see Michael C. Blumm &
Lizzy Pennock, Tribal Consultation: Toward Meaningful Collaboration with the Federal Government,
33 COLO. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (forthcoming 2021).
106
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 17.
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section briefly compares the Klamath removals, which are considerably closer to reality than is the
LSR dam removals under the Simpson proposal.
The Klamath River Basin has been nearly as dominated by dams as the Snake River Basin.
The Klamath, which flows from the Oregon Cascades into the Pacific Ocean in northern
California—was once the largest salmon-producing river south of the Columbia Basin.107 The
Klamath was the mainstay of several tribes for over 4000 years, producing nearly a million
spawning salmon annually and shaping their cultures.108 The 19th century brought non-native
settlement and pursuit of gold, timber, and farmland, transforming the Klamath Basin
environment.

The federal Reclamation Act soon followed, providing irrigated agriculture,

diminished streamflows, and declining salmon runs. Irrigation canals serving over 200,000 acres
of cropland growing potatoes, onions, barley, hay, and alfalfa but blocked salmon migration,
reduced water flows, and destroyed spawning habitat. By the late 20th century, Klamath salmon
runs were under seven percent of historic levels and were listed under the Endangered Species
Act.109
Federally-licensed hydroelectric dams followed the irrigation boom, including several
licensed to what today is known as Pacificorp, a large west-wide utility now controlled by Warren

107

See Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in the Klamath Basin, J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 49, 52 (2007) (natural spawning fish runs are only about 7% of historic numbers, and some other
runs were less than 2% of historical numbers).
108
John B. Hamilton et. al., Distribution of Anadromous Fishes in the Upper Klamath River Watershed
Prior to Hydropower Dams—A Synthesis of the Historical Evidence, 30 FISHERIES 10 (2005) (noting the
historical salmon runs of near or over one million salmon); Daniel McCool, Rivers of the Homeland: River
Restoration on Indian Reservations, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 549-54 (2007) (explaining the
history of the Klamath Tribes and their connections to the anadromous fish populations in the Klamath
Basin which they have relied on for food and spiritual connections for several thousands of years).
109
See Spain, supra note 107, at 51-52 (highlighting that by the 1990s the salmon runs had fallen to around
6% of historical levels); see also Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,592-93, 24,609 (May 6,
1997) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102) (the original listing of Klamath coho salmon was in
1997).
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Buffet.110 In 1913, a Pacificorp predecessor began constructing what became the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project by building two dams that completely blocked salmon access to seventyfive miles of the mainstem Klamath.111 Two other dams were constructed in the 1958 and 1962,
increasing the blocked area to 300 miles.112 Together, the four dams of the Klamath project (there
are a total of six dams in the project) supply power to about 1400 farms and 70,000 residences.113
In 1988, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed two upper basin fish in Upper Klamath
River—the Lost River sucker and the short-nose sucker—as endangered species.114 The upshot
was that the federal Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) had to store more water in upper basin reservoirs
and increase upper basin water flows to improve fish habitat. These requirements, combined with
a severe drought in the 1990s, proved catastrophic for the downriver Klamath River coho, which
were ESA-listed in 1997.115
In 2001, a Clinton-era Bureau plan that was upheld by a federal court called for operations
that would protect both the upper basin fish and the lower basin coho.116 But under pressure from

110

Need cite.
See GEORGE KRAMER, KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (FERC NO. 2082) HISTORIC CONTEXT
STATEMENT
40
(2003),
https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/hydro/klamathriver/relicensing/klamath-final-license-application/Appendix_E_6D_Historic_Context.pdf.
112
See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DETAILED PLAN FOR REMOVAL – KLAMATH RIVER DAMS,
KLAMATH FERC LICENSE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NO. 2082, OREGON-CALIFORNIA, 16, 22 (2006).
113
See Dam Removal in Pacific Northwest, supra note 102, at 1087.
114
See Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg.
27,130 (July 18, 1988) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 17.11).
115
Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU)
of Coho Salmon, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,592-93, 24,609 (May, 6, 1997) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R.
§ 223.102).
116
Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (D. Or. 2001). In 2001, one of the driest years on
record, after formal ESA consultation with NMFS and FWS, BoR produced a revised operations plan that
cut off water deliveries to irrigators. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, KLAMATH PROJECT 2001
ANNUAL OPERATIONS PLAN (2001). Implementation of the plan drew a lawsuit from irrigators, but the
court denied injunctive relief. Kandra, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. However, in 2002, the new Bush
Administration changed course, and a revised operations plan that restored irrigation deliveries led to the
immediate mortalities of an estimated 30,000 Klamath River salmon that same year. See Matthew G.
McHenry, The Worst of Times: A Tale of Two Fishes in the Klamath Basin, 33 ENVTL. L. 1019, 1020, 1028111
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local irrigators, the incoming Bush administration abandoned that plan on grounds of faulty
science.117 A year later, over 30,000 salmon perished in the lower Klamath due low river flows,
warm temperatures, and toxic water quality.118 The fish kill also caused economic calamity for the
northern California and Oregon ocean fishery, as closures produced over $100 million in losses in
2006 alone.119
In 2004, with the Klamath Hydroelectric Project’s federal license about to expire, Klamath
Basin tribes, the fishing industry, and environmentalists began a campaign to remove the four
hydroelectric dams, which provide no irrigation or flood control benefits. Four years later, the
licensee, Pacificorp, decided that the water quality and fish passage improvements required for
relicensing would make the dams uneconomical, and in 2010 agreed to a process that would
remove the projects in 2020.120 An accompanying settlement, the Klamath Basin Restoration
Agreement (KBRA), called for restructuring basin water flows, financed by a hoped-for $600
million in federal funding, not including the cost of dam removal.121
Under the agreement to remove the dams, the utility, ratepayers and taxpayers would share
in the costs of dam removal up to $495 million; any additional costs will be provided by the states

29 (2003), (explaining the tensions in the region in 2001 and 2002). Today, history seems to be repeating,
as the region is facing a drought larger than the one in 2001, with insufficient water to meet the needs of
the fish, the tribes, and the farmers. See Anna V. Smith, Will History Repeat in a Dry Klamath Basin the
Summer?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jun. 14, 2021), https://www.hcn.org/articles/north-water-will-historyrepeat-in-a-dry-klamath-basin-this-summer.
117
See McHenry, supra note 116, at 1028.
118
See id. at 1028-29.
119
Glen Spain, Why Congress Must Act to Restore the Klamath, FISHERMAN’S NEWS 1 (March 2013),
https://pcffa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/FN0313_PCFFA.pdf.
120
Need cite. Pacificorp had some experience with dam removal, having agreed to remove the Condit
Dam on the White Salmon River. See Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest, supra note 102, at 1058-66
(discussing the Condit dam removal and the restoration of the White Salmon River).
121
See David N. Allen, The Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement: Federal Law, Local
Compromise, and the Largest Dam Removal Project in History, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y, 427, 454 (2010).
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of California and Oregon.122 However, Congress proved decidedly uninterested in funding the
$600 million KBRA, which expired in 2015.123
Nonetheless, in 2016, the federal government, the states of California and Oregon, and
Pacificorp agreed to proceed with dam removal, and subsequent studies showed that dam removal
would produce substantial ecosystem and economic benefits, including an increase of over 30,000
annual jobs, while opening up some 400 miles of salmon habitat.124 In 2020, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission approved transferring the licenses to the Klamath River Renewal
Corporation, which will undertake the removal, and the states of California and Oregon.125
Removal of the four dams, which would be the world’s largest dam removal project, now seems
to be on the horizon.
Although the Klamath dam removal may seem nominally similar to the Simpson proposal,
its price tag is not only markedly less costly, it is taking place in a wholly different legal
environment, subject to the fish passage requirements of the Federal Power Act—and with the
support of the licensee. The LSR removal, were it to occur, would require congressional approval
and substantial federal appropriations from a Congress that was unwilling to fund the KBRA.
Conclusion

122

See Gillian Flaccus, Historic Deal Reached to Remove 4 massive Dams on Lower Klamath River,
OREGONLIVE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/environment/2020/11/historic-deal-reachedto-remove-4-massive-dams-on-lower-klamath-river.html. The agreement was later approved by FERC in
2021. See PacifiCorp, Klamath Renewal Corporation, State of Oregon, State of California, 175 F.E.R.C. ¶
61236, at *1.
123
See Debra Kahn, Path Forward Murky for Stymied Klamath Agreements, E&E NEWS (Dec. 24, 2021)
https://www-eenews-net.library.lcproxy.org/greenwire/stories/1060030021/search?keyword=Klamath.
124
See ROSEMARY KOSAKA, ECOSYSTEM SERVICE VALUES AND THE KLAMATH RIVER DAM REMOVal 22
(2017) (estimating that over 50 years, over 30,000 annual jobs could be created by the removal of the dams);
see also Klamath River Renewal Cooperation, Benefits of Klamath River Renewal,
https://www.klamathrenewal.org/benefits/ (last visited, Jul. 13, 2021).
125
PacifiCorp, Klamath Renewal Corporation, State of Oregon, State of California, 175 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61236,
at *1 (approving the transfer of licenses to allow for the removal of the Klamath River dams).
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The LSR dam saga is a long and dreary one. The dams should never have been built—and
would not have had they had been required to meet anything resembling a sensible cost-benefit
ratio.126 But the perceived necessity of providing post-war employment for returning servicemen,
coupled with a badly misguided view that any damage to the great natural resource of the Columbia
Basin—its prodigious salmon runs—could be offset through hatcheries, allowed Congress to make
what turns out to be a colossal, generational mistake. That mistake has very nearly extirpated
Idaho’s salmon.
The transportation benefits of the LSR dams are duplicative of readily available truck and
rail transport through the same Columbia Basin corridors that the barges traverse. Because barging
enjoys federal subsidies, it has been marginally cheaper for shipping agricultural products like
wheat.127 But the relative economic benefits are small and narrowly focused. The barging industry
itself employs very few.128 The LSR dams provide marginal power production that can be readily
replaced by wind and solar power.129 They offer no flood control, in fact, Lower Granite dam
regularly floods the city of Lewiston.130 Federal taxpayers, who remain responsible for the costs

126

See supra note 30 and accompanying text (Corps of Engineers’ estimate that the dams would return 15
cents of benefits for every federal dollar spent); on SAR ratios, see supra note 52.
127
See ECONorthwest, Lower Snake River Dams: Economic Tradeoffs of Removal 41-60 (2019)
(explaining the apparent low cost of barging in compared to rail and truck alternatives as being the result
of federal subsidies).
128
The barging industry is quite small in all three states that control barge transport on the Snake and
Columbia Rivers. According to data for 2019, in Washington, only about 300 people were employed
throughout the year by the “[i]nland water freight industry.” See WASHINGTON EMP. SEC. DEP’T, QCEW
ANNUAL AVERAGES 2019, REVISED (2020) [Excel Spreadsheet]. Oregon employed 145 people in 2019 in
the category “[i]nland water transportation.” See OREGON EMP. DEP’T, EMP. AND WAGES BY INDUSTRY
(QCEW), OREGON ANNUAL 2019, SUMMARY REPORT (2020) https://www.qualityinfo.org/edewind/?at=1&t1=0~4101000000~00~5~1021~48~00000~2019~00 [table]. In Idaho, only an average of 10
people were employed under the category “[w]ater transportation,” in 2016. See IDAHO DEP’T OF LAB.,
QCEW DASHBOARD: IDAHO – 2016 ANNUAL OWNERSHIP: PRIVATE – TABLE (2020)
https://lmi.idaho.gov/qcew [table].
129
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
130
See HAWLEY, supra note 89, at 101-33.
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of dredging and power turbine replacement necessary to maintain dams which should never have
been built must wonder why.
Congress began to recognize the scope of the mistake on the Snake in 1980 when it enacted
the Northwest Power Act.131

But while the program authorized by that statute has pioneered

significant advances in salmon science and has funded important habitat restoration, it was unable
to significantly restructure federal Columbia Basin dam operations, which have always favored
hydropower production over salmon protection.132
The shortcomings of the Northwest Power Act led to the ESA listings of the 1990s.133 The
ensuing federal biological opinions were routinely rejected by federal courts, as the National
Marine Fisheries Service and the federal agencies operating the Columbia Basin hydroelectric
system refused to seriously consider substantial changes like sufficient spills, reservoir
drawdowns, or dam breaching.134 Judicial calls for a “major overhaul” went unheeded.135 Two
federal judges, James Redden and Michael Simon, ordered spills at the dams.136 Judge Simon
even required a program EIS on the hydroelectric system’s continued effects on the listed
salmon.137 But that EIS rejected breaching the LSR dams, and the issue is back in court.138

131

See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 129-60 (discussing declining salmon runs and the
events that led to the passage of the Northwest Power Act).
132
See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 25, at 295-300 (explaining the events leading to the passage of
the Northwest Power Act).
133
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 30, at 173-75 (discussing how the failure of the Northwest
Power Act to achieve its lofty ambitions led to the Columbia Basin ESA salmon listings).
134
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d. 861, 875-76 (D. Or. 2016)
(explaining that NMFS failed to consider several reasonable alternatives, as required by NEPA).
135
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
136
See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-6940-RE, 2004 WL 1698050,
at *6 (D. Ore. July 29, 2004) (Judge Redden requiring spills at Ice Harbor Dam); see, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803, 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming injunctive relief
granted by Judge Simon to environmentalists that called for spills at several Columbia Basin dams).
137
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 950 (D. Or. 2016).
138
See NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, et al., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEMS OPERATIONS FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 7-2 (2020); see also Fishing, Conservation Groups Return to Court
to Challenge Latest Failed Plan for Columbia-Snake Salmon, EARTHJUSTICE (Jan. 19, 2021)
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Still on the horizon is the potential application of the Clean Water Act to remedy the lethal
and rising water temperatures which the LSR dams exacerbate.139 Given the recalcitrance that
both the federal and state governments have exhibited over application water quality temperature
standards to Columbia Basin dams,140 enforcement will almost certainly require judicial oversight.
The costs of Clean Water Act compliance, coupled with the costs of required spills, may make the
alterative of dam breaching more economically attractive.
Congressman Simpson’s arresting breaching proposal,141 which has occasioned this Idaho
Law Review symposium,142 should be evaluated in light of this decades-long of halting efforts to
accommodate salmon recovery in the functioning a hydroelectric system. The great flexibility of
the system to improve the dire condition of Idaho’s spawning salmon has been invoked only
grudgingly and under court injunctions. The enormous price tag placed on the Simpson proposal
makes it quite unlikely that Congress will enact anything resembling the Simpson proposal in its
current form, especially in light of Congress’ disinclination to fund the Klamath Basin Restoration
Agreement, at an estimated cost of $96 million annually, for riparian restoration and water security
for irrigators affected by the planned removal of four Klamath Basin dams.143 The cost of the
Simpson proposal, is exponentially higher, including $14 billion for replacement power,144 thus

https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2021/fishing-conservation-groups-return-to-court-to-challenge-latestfailed-plan-for-columbia-snake-salmon.
139
See Columbia, Snake River Dam Operators Must Make Plan to Keep Waters Cold Enough for Salmon
Survival,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS/OREGON
LIVE
(May,
13,
2020),
https://www.oregonlive.com/environment/2020/05/columbia-snake-river-dam-operators-must-make-planto-keep-waters-cold-enough-for-salmon-survival.html (explaining that the Washington Dept. of Ecology
issued CWA 401 certifications requiring the Corps to lower water temperatures).
140
See supra notes 65, 69 and accompanying text.
141
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15.
142
Cite Symposium, 58 IDAHO L. REV. ___ (2022).
143
See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., SUMMARY OF KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 10
(2007).
144
See NORTHWEST IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 14-15.
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seems quite unrealistic.

Moreover, the premise underlying the estimated price-tag—that no

affected interest should suffer any increased cost—is open to considerable question. There is no
reason, for example, why those who have received such federal subsidies should expect them to
continue in perpetuity.145 More realistic cost estimates of LSR dam breaching have suggested that
the benefits far exceed the costs.146
Other objections to the Simpson proposal concern its promised license extensions and its
long moratorium on court challenges.147 Of course, some changes during the legislative process
are to be expected. But judicial oversight of the hydropower-salmon conflict in the Columbia
Basin has always been essential to whatever little progress has been made for salmon migration
over the last-half century. To think that court review will be unnecessary for three-and-a-half
decades seems unrealistic if Idaho salmon recovery is the goal.
The future of the federal LSR dams, unlike the non-federal Klamath dams, is in the hands
of Congress, which so casually authorized them over three-quarters of a century ago.148 In an era
in which there are multiple impediments to congressional action, enacting anything resembling the
Simpson proposal will require the active support of the Idahoan citizenry. If Idahoans realize the

145

See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The barging industry appears to be profitable only because
of the subsidies it receives. Therefore, among the cost estimates that might be questioned is the $4 billion
for river transportation improvements, see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. This estimate is
nearly three times what the Simpson proposal set as the cost of breaching the dams.
146
See Saving Snake River Water and Salmon, supra note 16, at 1023-30 (analyzing several economic
reports and concluding the Pacific Northwest would economically benefit from the breaching of the LSR
dams), see also NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, et al., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEMS OPERATIONS
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 6-1-7-243 (2020) (analyzing the effects of breaching the
dams under option “MO-3”). Although the EIS did not conclude that breaching the dams was worth the
cost (a conclusion that has prompted a lawsuit, see supra note 17 and accompanying text), the EIS did
highlight several benefits of dam breaching. For example, of the alternatives considered, dam breaching
provided the best chance for salmon recovery. NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: COLUMBIA RIVER OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 29 (2020). The
EIS’s rejection of dam breaching was quite tenuous, stating “this EIS is not expected to end the regional
conversation about the future of the four lower Snake River dams.” Id. at 34.
147
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
148
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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substantial economic benefits accompanying the restoration of salmon runs to central Idaho—and
also understand the marginal benefits provided by the out-of-state LSR dams, whose electric power
provides little or no benefit to Idaho consumers—they may come to realize that central Idaho’s
exceptional salmon habitat could fuel a vibrant economy built around sustainable salmon
harvests.149 The salmon resource, so resilient and with such enduring fidelity to place, can, if given
the chance, revitalize the central Idaho economy.

149

Among the economic benefits breaching the LSR dams is salmon-based tourism. A 2005 study estimated
that the direct and indirect benefits of salmon restoration would be nearly $550 annually. DON C. READING,
THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESTORING SALMON AND STEELHEAD FISHING IN IDAHO 2 (2005)
https://www.wildsalmon.org/images/PDFs/FishingEconReport.05.pdf. A more recent study suggests that
for every 100 salmon above the 1998 returns– a relative banner year – would add 0.68 jobs, $10,757 in
personal income, and almost $37,000 in business transactions. John R, McKean, Donn M. Johnson & R.
Garth Taylor, Regional Economic Impacts of the Snake River Steelhead and Salmon Recovery, 24 SOCIETY
& NATURAL RESOURCES 569, 579 (2011) (also noting that increased salmon returns will produce more
travel of anglers to Idaho). There is also the National Recreation Area that the Simpson plan seeks to create.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. National Parks provide substantial benefits to nearby
communities. See Nat’l Park Serv., National Park Visitor Spending Generates Economic Impact of more
than $41 Billion (Jun. 11, 2020), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/national-park-visitor-spendinggenerates-economic-impact-more-41-billion (explaining the high level of tourist spending in gateway
communities near national parks). See also Randall Gordy, Kortney Cose & Rituraj Yadav, Life as we
know it: An environmental economic perspective on breaching the Snake River dams, IDAHO STATESMAN
(March 1, 2021), https://www.idahostatejournal.com/freeaccess/life-as-we-know-it-an-environmentaleconomic-perspective-on-breaching-the-snake-river-dams/article_4bea5a48-94a3-59a9-a216b0212d195f12.html (referencing a University of Idaho study concluding that breaching the LSR dams
would save between $12 million to $2 billion in power costs over the first 10 years and $2 billion to $5
billion over 20 years and produce a five-fold increase in recreational, generating between $2 and $7 billion
over ten years).
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